

Simulation and Zero-knowledge

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Simulation Paradigm (Real-ideal Paradigm)

- Simulation Definition for Encryption:

Informal: Seeing Ciphertext gives almost no information.

$$\{Enc_k(c)\} \approx \text{Sim}(\) \rightarrow \{ct\}$$

Formally,

[Goldwasser, Micali 82].

$$\begin{aligned} & \left| \begin{array}{l} \text{Enc is "semantically secure" if:} \\ \exists \text{ ppt. Simulator } S, (\text{s.t. } \forall \text{ ppt. Adv } \exists \text{ negl. } \varepsilon.) \\ \text{s.t. } \forall n \in N, \forall m \in M_m \xrightarrow{\text{(message length)}} \\ \{Enc_k(m)\} \approx \{S(1^n)\} \end{array} \right. \end{aligned}$$

For multiple msgs m_1, \dots, m_h . $\text{poly}(n)$.

$$\{Enc_k(m_1), \dots, Enc_k(m_h)\} \approx_c \{S(1^h, 1^h)\}$$

Example (from last lec)

$$M = K = \{0,1\}^n$$

$$\text{Gen} \rightarrow k \text{ for a PRF: } \{0,1\}^k \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$$

$$Enc_k(m, r) = F_k(r) \oplus m, r$$

$$Dec(C) = F_k(C_2) \oplus C_1 = m.$$

Theorem This encryption scheme satisfies Semantic Security

Proof: \Rightarrow Construct such a simulator, S

S : tosses strings $R \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$, $r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$
outputs (R, r)

As for multiple msgs, use Hybrid Argument \sim

Claim: $\boxed{\text{Indistinguishable Enc} = \text{Semantic Enc}}$

proof: Ind \Rightarrow Sem

$$S(1^n)_{k \in K} = Enc_k(0^n).$$

proof. $\vdash \text{m} \Rightarrow \text{Sem}$


$$S(1^n)_{k \in K} = \text{Enc}_k(0^n)$$

$$\forall m \in M. \text{Enc}_k(m) \approx \text{Enc}_k(0^n)$$

$\text{Sem} \Rightarrow \text{Ind.}$

$$\text{Enc}_k(m_1, r) \approx S(1^n) \approx \text{Enc}_k(m_2, r)$$

Interactive Proof



NP: Language $L \in NP$ if.


$$x \in L, \exists w. \text{poly machine } A. \text{ s.t. } A(x, w) = 1$$

Graph (non)-Isomorphism

$$G_1(V_1, E_1) \quad G_2(V_2, E_2)$$

$$G_1 \cong G_2 \quad \text{if } \exists \pi: V \rightarrow V \text{ s.t. } \pi(V_1) = V_2$$

$$\text{and } E_2 = \{(\pi(v_1), \pi(v_2)) : v_1, v_2 \in V_1\}$$



Interactive Prof. $L, x, (P, V)$
 $\uparrow \text{ppt.}$

Completeness if $x \in L$

$$\Pr[\text{Prover}(x) \rightarrow p, \text{s.t. } \text{Ver}(x, \pi) = 1] = 1$$

Soundness if $x \notin L$.

$$\Pr[\text{Prover}(x) \rightarrow p, \text{s.t. } \text{Ver}(x, \pi) = 1] < \text{negl.}$$

(p is all interaction.)

Zero-Knowledge


For honest V , $\exists \text{ ppt. Simulator } S$. such that

$$S(x) \approx_{\text{instance}} \text{Witness}$$

For malicious V . \exists ppt Simulator S . s.t.
 $S(x, V) \approx_c \text{Witness}$

Zero-Knowledge Proof for NPG

- 3-coloring



Property:

- Hiding: $\forall m_0, m_1$
 $\{\text{Commit}(m_0, r)\} \approx_c \{\text{Commit}(m_1, r)\}$
- Binding: $\forall m_0, m_1 \in M$. $m_0 \neq m_1$ and $\forall r, r$.

$$\text{Commit}(m_0, r_0) \neq \text{Commit}(m_1, r_0)$$

One construction:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{OWP } f, \text{ hardcore bit } b \\ m \in \{0,1\} \\ r \leftarrow U_n \\ \text{Commit}(m, r) = f(r) \oplus b(r) \oplus m. \end{aligned}$$

2. Proof for Zero-Knowledge.

Construct Sim:

- Commit (Random Coloring)
- Query V . if e works, output e . and then open e .
otherwise goto Commit

Then $\text{Sim}(G, V) \approx_c \text{View}(P, V)$

(Proved by Hybrid Argument).

$\text{Commit}(m, r)$.