

Construct pseudorandom generators

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Secure Encryption from PRG.

- Recall Perfect Secrecy:

$$\Pr_k[\text{Enc}(m_1) = c] = \Pr_k[\text{Enc}(m_2) = c]. \quad \forall m_1, m_2, c.$$



Relax the definition: $\{\text{Enc}_k(m_1)\} \approx_c \{\text{Enc}_k(m_2)\}$

Namely \forall p.p.t. Adv. $\exists \epsilon. \forall n \in \mathbb{N}$

$$\left| \Pr[\text{Adv}(\text{Enc}_k(m_1)) \rightarrow 1] - \Pr[\text{Adv}(\text{Enc}_k(m_2)) \rightarrow 1] \right| < \epsilon(n).$$

Consider:

$$K = \{0, 1\}^n, \quad M = \{0, 1\}^m, \quad m > n.$$

$$\text{Gen} : s \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$$

$$\text{Enc}(m, s) = m \oplus \text{PRG}(s).$$

$$\text{Dec}(c, s) = c \oplus \text{PRG}(s).$$

Prove this satisfies def above.

Hybrid Proof:

$$\begin{aligned}
 H_0 &= \text{Enc}_k(m_0) = m_0 \oplus \text{PRG}(s) \\
 H_1 &= m_0 \oplus Y \leftarrow U_m \\
 H_2 &= m_1 \oplus Y \\
 H_3 &= \text{Enc}_k(m_1) = m_1 \oplus \text{PRG}(s)
 \end{aligned}$$

PR Generator

$$G: D \rightarrow R \quad \text{such that}$$

PRG \Leftarrow One-way

$$G(s) \approx_c U(R) \quad \text{and} \quad |D| < |R|$$

Hardcore bit

A poly. computable function $h: \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is hardcore bit for a OWF f . if: \forall p.p.t. Adv. & negl. $\epsilon(n)$

$$\Pr_{x, \text{Adv}}[\text{Adv}(1^n, f(x)) \rightarrow h(x)] < \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon(n)$$

$$\Pr_{x, Adv} [Adv(L^n, f(x)) \rightarrow h(x)] < \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon(n)$$

Example: $x \rightarrow g^x \text{ mod } q$. ($q=2p+1$).

$$MSB(x) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } x > \frac{p}{2} \\ 0 & \text{if } x < \frac{p}{2} \end{cases} \Rightarrow \text{Hardcore bit}$$

most significant bit

Example 2: $RSA(x) = x^e \text{ mod } N$.

$$LSB(x) = x_n \quad (x = x_1 \dots x_n)$$

Suppose f is a OWP $\{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$ and h is f 's hardcore bit.

↓
permutation

then we can construct PRG: $\{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{n+1}$ as

$$x \in \{0,1\}^n \mapsto f(x) \parallel h(x)$$

(concatenate)

Theorem (GL) (hardcore bit always exists)

If f is a OWP \nearrow concatenate

$$\text{Then } g(x,r) = f(x) \parallel r$$

$\{0,1\}^n$

Define $h: \{0,1\}^{2n} \rightarrow \{0,1\}$
 $x,r \mapsto \langle x,r \rangle \text{ mod } 2$.

| h is a hardcore bit

Prove.

$$\text{If } \Pr_{x,r} [Adv(f(x),r) \rightarrow \langle x,r \rangle] > \frac{1}{2} + \delta$$

1. If Adv. wins w.p. = 1.

$$f(x) \cdot \begin{matrix} r = 000\dots1 \rightarrow x_n \\ r = 000\dots10 \rightarrow x_{n-1} \\ \dots \end{matrix}$$

$\Rightarrow f$ not OWP

2. Adv wins w.p. $\frac{3}{4} + \delta$

$$\text{Def. } S_{good} = \{x \in \{0,1\}^n \mid \Pr_{r, Adv} [Adv(f(x),r) \rightarrow \langle x,r \rangle] > \frac{3}{4} + \frac{\delta}{2}\}$$

$$\text{Claim: } |S_{good}| > \frac{\delta}{2} \cdot 2^n \quad (\text{non-neg!})$$

- Claim: $|S_{good}| > \frac{\epsilon}{2} \cdot 2^n$ (non-negl.)

Suppose $\Pr_{x \in \{0,1\}^n} [x \in S_{good}] < \frac{\epsilon}{2}$.

then $\Pr_{x,r} [Adv(f(x), r) \rightarrow \langle x, r \rangle]$

$$\leq \Pr[x \in S_{good}] \cdot 1 + (1 - \Pr[x \in S_{good}]) \cdot (\frac{3}{4} + \delta)$$

$$\leq \frac{\epsilon}{2} + \frac{3}{4} + \frac{1}{2} = \frac{3}{4} + \delta, \text{ contradiction!}$$

Then suppose x falls in this set.

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} r_1 = r \\ r_2 = r + 000 \dots 01 \end{array} \right\} \begin{array}{l} \text{fail} \leq \frac{1}{4} \\ \leq \frac{1}{4} \end{array} \left. \vphantom{\begin{array}{l} r_1 = r \\ r_2 = r + 000 \dots 01 \end{array}} \right\} \begin{array}{l} \text{succeed in both} \\ \text{w.p.} \geq \frac{1}{2} + \delta \end{array}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Then } \langle x, r_1 \rangle - \langle x, r_2 \rangle &\Rightarrow \text{Get } x. \\ &= \langle x, 000 \dots 01 \rangle = x_n \end{aligned}$$